The fifth merger wave in the USA and the parallel fourth merger wave in the UK that occurred in the 1990s was characterised by a large number of acquisitions of firms operating in high technology areas such as the telecommunications, computers, the Internet, biotechnology, communications etc. These mergers accompanied and, in fact, were triggered by stunningly high market valuations of high technology firms around the world. Value creation logic of these mergers rests on real options i.e. new growth opportunities with a large scope for valuation errors and potential value destruction.
Introduction
It is now well documented that shareholders of acquiring firms experience value losses following acquisitions. Sudarsanam (2003, ch.4) after extensively reviewing the literature covering several countries concludes that acquisitions are on average value destroying for at least the acquirer shareholders although shareholders of acquired companies make substantial gains. Value gains, ex ante, arise from different sources of synergy between the merging firms. identifies three broad sources of value: revenue enhancement, cost savings and creating of growth opportunities.
These sources are more or less important in different types of acquisitions: cost savings in mergers driven by scale and scope economies, revenue enhancement in mergers driven by enhanced market power or sharing of marketing resources and capabilities and new growth opportunities in mergers of firms that share resources and capabilities such as R & D, intellectual assets etc.
The fifth merger wave in the USA and the parallel fourth merger wave in the UK that occurred in the 1990s was characterised by a large number of acquisitions of firms operating in high technology areas such as the telecommunications, computers, the Internet, biotechnology, communications etc. Many of the mergers were also driven by the vision of technology convergence among media, telecommunications, the Internet e.g. the acquisitions made by Vivendi and AOL-Time Warner. These mergers accompanied and, in fact, were triggered by stunningly high market valuations of high technology firms around the world. These valuations as well as the anticipated value gains in high technology mergers were based on expectations of revenue enhancements through, say, cross-selling of the merging partners' products and services and new growth opportunities.
Given the dominance of new growth opportunities as a source of value gains in these mergers, the scope for valuation errors is greater than when value gains are expected to arise from cost saving or revenue enhancement that exploits established products and established markets. This larger scope means that acquirer shareholder value gains in high technology acquisitions are likely to be smaller or value losses greater than in other types of acquisitions.
Pursuit of growth opportunities is in the nature of investment in strategic growth options (SGOs) or real options. Such options are far more risky with more volatile payoffs than investments devoid of such options e.g. acquisitions driven by cost saving.
Which firms make acquisitions that are in the nature of SGOs depends on the managerial risk incentives in acquiring firms -whether managers are risk-averse or risk preferring, the payoffs to risk taking or risk avoidance and the penalties when managers strategic gambles fail. Managerial risk incentive has been examined in the economics, finance, and management literature since early 20 th century (Berle and Means (1932) ; Marris (1964) ). The debate about managerial risk incentives and preferences, however, is still inconclusive (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998) , Wright, Mukherji and Kroll (2001) , Simon, Houghton and Savelli (2003) ).
On one side of the debate is the traditional economics perspective, represented by agency theory (Jensen and Meckling (1976) , Fama (1980) ). The agency model of the firm considers managers as rational, utility maximisers. Compared to shareholders in their firms, these managers hold undiversified portfolios of both their monetary and human capital and hence are likely to be risk averse. On the other hand, shareholders can diversify away the firm-specific risk and hence are risk neutral. Managers in making acquisitions are expected to display their risk-aversion. If, as a consequence, managers pass up valuable positive NPV but high risk projects, this causes an underinvestment problem for the shareholders who bear the opportunity cost of passing up.
It may, however, be in the interests of shareholders to encourage managers to undertake high risk-high payoff investments and moderate the risk impact of such investments through diversification. Managerial stock ownership and stock options, by transforming managers into shareholders may increase the incentive to undertake high risk investments. Nevertheless, even such transformation does not reduce the degree of non-diversification of the managerial portfolio. Thus in the classical agency m odel, managerial risk aversion is the norm and investment decisions that deviate from riskaversion are considered anomalous. Corporate governance structure may reduce the underinvestment problem by monitoring managers' investment decisions and ensuring positive NPV projects are undertaken. However, traditional corporate governance structures and regulations such as the requirements of the Turnbull report in the UK may discourage rather than facilitate risk taking by managers even when optimal. An appropria te and judicious mixture of fixed and performance-related compensation such as stock options may alleviate managerial concerns but also mitigate the underinvestment problems.
There may be other factors that alleviate the underinvestment problem and even encourage the opposite type of managerial behaviour -overinvestment in high risk, and possibly value destroying, projects. Bounded rationality and information asymmetry models also suggest that managerial risk taking may be rational but not perceived as suc h by stock markets and shareholders who don't share the same rationality bounds or the same information set. Corporate governance may correct both bounded rationality and informational asymmetry and allow optimal risk taking.
Recent developments in behavioural agency models argue that managerial risk taking is not a mere deviation from traditional agency assumption of rational risk aversion (see March and Shapira (1987) , Eisenhardt (1989) , Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) , Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998) , Wright, Mukherji and Kroll (2001) ).
These authors criticise the risk aversion assumption as being too restrictive and unrealistic about human behaviour. Instead, they argue that managers may be "irrational" and, under psychological influences, have different risk attitudes in different situations (see Child (1974) , Hambrick and Mason (1984) , MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1990) , Sitkin and Pablo (1992) , Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) ). Managers may undertake risky projects because they overoptimistically underestimate the risk (March and Shapira (1987) , Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) ), or, because of their past performance, become overconfident that they can 'handle' the risk (Bromiley (1991) , Sitkin and Pablo (1992) , Simon, Houghton and Savelli (2003) ). Managers may also indulge in high risk investments in order to retrieve a bad situation, a last throw of the dice.
These cognitive biases may lead managers to undertake risky acquisitions, overestimate their benefits, underestimate their risks and overpay for what they buy (Roll (1986) , Hayward and Hambrick (1997) , Barberis and Thaler (2002) ). High technology acquisitions provide particularly suitable channels for such biases since they are more in the nature of real options, with considerable uncertainty, the need to take a view of the future and the contingent nature of the subsequent investments (Smit, 2001 ). Paradoxically, the contingency of future investments may allow managers simultaneously to be overoptimistic about the upside potential and to downplay the risk because of the option not to make further investments. How does the corporate governance structure control managerial risk taking behaviour? An optimal governance mechanism should curb suboptimal risk avoidance as well as excessive risk preference among managers. In the case of high technology acquisitions, the latter problem is the more serious. If so, robust governance will be associated with value creation in high risk, high technology acquisitions. The research findings about the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms produce many contradictory results (Franks, Mayer and Renneboog (2001) , Weir, Laing and Mcknight (2002) , Core, Guay and Larcker (April, 2003) ). This could be due to the noise in the research methodology, or inefficiency of the governance mechanisms.
In this paper, we focus on the wealth gains to acquiring firm shareholders following acquisitions of high technology targets. We consider such acquisitions to be pregnant with real options. We track the post-acquisition performance of the acquirers over three years using a variety of benchmark models. We examine whether different corporate governance devices in acquirers influence the shareholder wealth outcomes of high technology acquisitions.
Our results show that SGO-type acquirers greatly underperform their industry peers and companies with the similar size and book-to-market ratio. Interestingly, we find a negative relationship between management shareholdings and post-acquisition performance of high tech acquisitions suggesting that managerial stock ownership interests in their firms mitigate their risk aversion. Monitoring mechanisms such as institutional blockholders, board structures, and board subcommittees, have no disciplinary effect on managers' acquisition decisions that destroy shareholder value.
Thus governance mechanisms seem unable to moderate managerial risk taking and overinvestment in high risk acquisitions.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical framework. Section 3 describes the data and the research methodology. Results are reported in sections 4. Conclusions, further work and limitations are discussed in section 5.
Theoretical framework

High technology acquisitions as strategic growth options (SGOs)
Real option theory has been widely applied into corporate finance in the past ten years. M&As contain various types of real options (Smith and Triantis (1995) ). One of the most common type is growth option which stems from the creation of new resources and capabilities that will confer competitive advantage at some future, but indeterminate, date after acquisition (Sudarsanam, 2003, ch.5) . The concept of growth option has been applied in many areas. Myers (1977) describes firm value as being the sum of the value of the assets in place and the value of growth options. To distinguish from the other types of growth options, this study terms the growth options embedded in M&As as "Strategic Growth Options" as Smith and Triantis (1995) do. The acquisitions mainly aiming for growth options are thus called SGO-type M&As.
Specifically, SGO-type M&A aims to 1) acquire new resources and capabilities to augment the resources and capabilities of the acquirer in relation to new growth areas or to meet new competitive threats 2) generate new products or new processes, or access new markets, all of which represent a discontinuous, not merely incremental, change to the acquirer's and the target's pre-acquisition products, processes or business areas and 3) exploit future growth opportunities generated by the acquisition. Such opportunities may not be 'on the radar' at the time of the acquisition and may even be beyond current technolo gical comprehension.
Growth options are embodied in intangible assets such as patents, licences, goodwill, etc. They may be firm-specific, having been generated by the firm's experience, learning-by-doing, organisational routines or other similar phenomeno n (Myers (1977) ). The acquirer thus may buy the target firm and transfer the growth options from the target to the merging firm. This may augment the resources and capabilities of the acquirer and bring it many growth opportunities (Trigeorgis (1995) (Kohers and Kohers, 2001) . Strategic acquisitions, alliances and investment in internal capabilities such as R&D are important in this area (Harrison (2000) ). An acquisition of a high-tech target brings the acquirer technology expertise, some unique technology, or some infrastructure especially used for a certain technological development. All of these may enhance the capabilities of the acquirer to explore into a new growth area, gain core competence, achieve technological breakthrough and thereby gain sustainable competitive advantage. In contrast, non-high-tech industries are usually mature and traditional industries such as food industry, retail industry, and utility industry. Acquisitions in these industries are mostly driven by cost reduction and revenue enhancement, both of which are based on the existing resources of the two companies (Sudarsanam, 2003, ch. 5) .
Risk profile of high technology M&As
An SGO-type acquisition represents a call option on the target firm and its assets.
The acquisition cost represents the call option premium. As with a call option written on a financial asset such as a stock or currency, a real option's value depends on the following factors:
• The value of the benefits associated with the underlying assets e.g. a target firm in an acquisition • The cost of second and subsequent stage investments in those assets after the first stage investment in 'buying' the option • The volatility of the value of the underlying assets
• The time to making second and subsequent stage investments
• The cost of maintenance to preserve the value of the underlying assets while remaining idle and unexploited • The interest rate Although the benefits of SGO-type acquisitions may be substantial, the probability of achieving those benefits may be low. The costs of SGO consist of: 1) the acquisition premium 2) other transaction costs incurred during the pre-acquisition process including due diligence, negotiation, advisor fee, legal fee, etc 3) all the intermediate costs incurred after the acquisition and before the second stage investment, for example, the R&D cost. An accurate estimation of these costs is crucial for the acquirer to decide whether or not to undertake the acquisition and to decide the corresponding M&A strategy.
However, the scope for estimation error is large. First, serious information asymmetry exists in intangibles-intensive companies between insiders and outsiders (Lev (2001) ). This increases the difficulty for target identification, valuation and postacquisition integration. Second, the traditional discounted cash flow technique which is often used in practice is far too simple to value a complicated strategic acquisition (Kester (1984) ; Smith and Triantis (1995) ). Although the option pricing model has been widely discussed in academic area, its use by managers appears to be limited (Bowman and Moskowitz (2001) ). Managers have to greatly rely on intuition rather than objective quantitative analysis to make investment decisions. Thus there i s large scope for speculation. To make things worse, it is reported that technologists are rarely involved in valuation process (James, Georghiou and Metcalfe (1998) A strategic acquisition may trigger 'me-too' acquisitions by competitors and thereby erode the first mover competitive advantage. This may force the first mover to seek to exploit the acquired firm's resources and capabilities prematurely thereby reducing the value of the acquisition to the acquirer. Since high tech industries rely on human resource, organisational skills and culture, post-acquisition integration problems may arise from the cultural difference, the dissimilar technological philosophy and the diverse production structure of the two companies are great obstacles to the successful development of the underlying asset of the option. Some studies have reported that acquisitions undermine the development of the technology capabilities by diverting resources and management attention away from the existing business (see Hitt, Hoskisson, Ireland and Harrison, (1991) ; Chakrabarti, Hauschildt and Suverkrup (1994); Gerpott (1995) ; Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson and Moesel (1996) ; James, Georghiou and Metcalfe (1998) ). Dyer (2002) analyses the performance of GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) following the merger in 2000 and reports that research often grinds to a halt when mergers are announced because people wonder if they will have a job and if their projects will be continued. GSK has lost probably around five years' research time due to a series of merger activities and four out of twelve top scientists in R&D group have left since the merger in 2000. The company suffers greatly from faltering innovation.
Moreover, there may exist technological uncertainty since it is still not certain whether or not the acquired technology could lead to commercially successful product or service. The payoffs from technology investment are often highly negative ( Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis (2001) and Kothari, Laguerre and Leone (2001) ).
The time to expiration refers to the time interval between the acquisition and the second stage investment to exploit the acquired capabilities and resources. There is no set length for the time period (Smit (2001) ). For example, a research project could be extended for a longer period of time than expected. This may greatly diminish acquisition benefits and depress the acquirer's stock price. A company may choose to abandon the option if it urgently needs the resources elsewhere.
Taken together, although SGO-type acquisitions may bring acquirers substantial benefits when successful, to achieve success is difficult. The combination of acquisition-related risks and intangibles-related risk attributes creates a unique risk profile of SGO-type acquisitions, making them far riskier than acquisitions pursuing cost reduction and revenue enhancement, and no easier than internal R&D investment.
If high risk is rewarded with high returns we expect that high technology acquisitions will generate high returns.
Agency model of the firm and high technology acquisitions
Agency theory postulates that the separation of ownership and control makes the interests of shareholders and managers diverge (Berle and Means; 1932; Marris, 1964; Ross, 1973; Fama and Jensen, 1983) . Managers, as agents and actual controllers of the company, often pursue their own interests such as power, prestige, high salary and security, at the cost of shareholders as well as other stakeholders. Acquisition is one of the opportunities that managers exploit to serve their own interests (see, Firth, 1980; Jensen, 1986; Hill and Snell, 1988; Amihud and Lev, 1981; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Doukas, Holmen and Travlos, 2002) . Individuals are assumed to be risk averse. They would demand a higher expected return to compensate for a higher risk (March and Shapira (1987) ).
In the agency model of the firm, shareholders, as principals, may be able to diversify their shareholdings across firms and mitigate or eliminate firm-specific risk.
As a result they may be risk-neutral as regards firm-specific risk. Managers are still considered risk averse since their employment security and wealth are tied to one firm (see Jensen and Meckling (1976) , Fama (1980) , Kroll, Wright and Theerathorn (1993) ; Wright, Ferris, Sarin and Awasthi (1996) ). Managerial risk aversion creates opportunity costs for risk-neutral shareholders that prefer managers to undertake growth-oriented risky projects to maximize the return to their shareholdings. Therefore, corporate governance mechanisms are designed to drive managers to select riskier projects so as to align the actions and choices of managers with the interests of shareholders (see Jensen and Meckling (1976) , Fama and Jensen (1983) , Lewellen and Loderer (1985) , Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) , Shleifer and Vishny (1986) , Hill and Snell (1988) , Wright, Ferris, Sarin and Awasthi (1996) ). If such were the case, strong governance mechanisms should have a positive impact on shareholder value when managers undertake high risk, high technology acquisitions.
Compensation contract, which links a portion of compensation to firm performance, is one of the key corporate control devices. Managers who are motivated to improve personal wealth, will exhibit risk preferences similar to those of shareholders by selecting riskier projects ( Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman (2001) , Ryan Jr and Wiggins III (2002) , Core, Guay and Larcker (April, 2003) ). Monitors such as the board of directors, or institutional blockholders, directly observe and evaluate managers' behaviours, outcomes, or both to ensure managerial decisions are consistent with shareholder objectives (see Wright, Ferris, Sarin and Awasthi (1996) , Weir, Laing and Mcknight (2002) , etc).
However, research findings about the efficiency of those mechanisms produce many contradictory results (Franks, Mayer and Renneboog (2001) , Weir, Laing and Mcknight (2002) , Core, Guay and Larcker (April, 2003) ). This could be due to the noise in the research methodology, and/or inefficiency of the mechanisms. Designed based on the assumption that managers are rational and risk averse, these mechanisms are unlikely to have much of an effect on irrational and risk-seeking managers (Barberis and Thaler (September, 2002) ). "These managers think that they are maximizing firm value, even if in reality, they are not. Since they think that they are already doing the right thing, stock options or debt are unlikely to change their behaviour." (p. 58). Such a managerial attitude may be due less to a fraudulent intent than to overconfidence and overoptimism. Real option type acquisitions provide fairly rich pickings for managers prone to these biases. Governance mechanisms may not be fine-tuned to deter such biases and this failure may allow value destroying acquisitions.
Managerial compensation, risk incentives and acquisition gains
In corporate governance, executive compensation contract is used to align There are mainly two types of compensation: base pay, i.e. any contractually guaranteed pay, such as salary, and variable pay, i.e. any contingent pay, such as a performance bonus, a long-term incentive plan (LTIP) cash and share award or share options. Variable pay links executive compensations with firm performance, thus provide the incent ive for managers to undertake risky project to improve firm performance (Conyon and Murphy, 2000) .
Variable pay can be further divided into non-equity-based compensations and equity-based compensations. Some researchers argue that non-equity-based compensations that are based on short-term horizon provide managers with t he incentives to focus on projects that pay back quickly and to invest too little in long-term and risky projects (Jensen,1986) . Many studies have shown that a vast majority of CEO's incentive to increase stock price are driven by variation in the value of his stock and option portfolio, that is, not by annual salary or fixed bonus (Core, Guay and Larcker, 2003) . However, some researchers argue that equity-based compensation could be ineffective. The reason is that managers with such compensation bear more financial risk. This would drive them to invest le ss in risky projects to protect their human capital (Fama (1980) , Lambert (1986) , Mason (1984), Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998) ). Other researcher argue that above theory applies to restricted stock awards and stock ownership that have linear payoffs (Ryan Jr and Wiggins III (2002)), but not stock options, which are tied to stock price, but limit downside risk (Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman (2001) , Ryan Jr and Wiggins III (2002) ). Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman (2001) found that managers with high stock option compensation paid lower acquisition premia, acquired targets with higher growth opportunities, and made acquisitions engendering larger increase in firm risks. Anderson, Banker and Ravindran (2000) state that risk taking in high-tech industries is encouraged by stock options.
These contrasting effects of fixed and variable compensation and of stock ownership and stock options on managerial risk taking give rise to different testable implications.
Variable compensation encourages more risk taking than fixed compensation. Stock options encourage more risk taking than stock awards. In this study we empirically examine the impact of managerial stock ownership on value gains from high technology acquisitions. Higher levels of stock ownership will be associated with lower risk. We also expect that in high risk, high technology acquisitions, there will be a negative relation between managerial stock ownership and shareholder value gains.
This line of reasoning runs counter to the traditional alignment argument that ownership will positively impact on the shareholder wealth effects of managerial investment decisions.
Corporate governance, monitoring and acquisition gains
Institutional block shareholders
Institutional blockholders are argued to have a stronger incentive to oppose management proposals that do not enhance shareholder interests (Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) ). Firstly, institutional investors perform quality research in order to identify efficient firms for investing f unds ( Duggal and Millar (1999) ). Some institutional shareholders communicate directly with senior managers and thus may influence the terms of acquisition bids. Secondly, institutional blockholders have strong economic incentives to monitor the ma nagement since they are able to capture a large fraction of the wealth gains from the corporate value enhancing (Shleifer and Vishny (1986) ). Effective monitoring can facilitate the rollback of anti-takeover devices, promote an appropriate management compensation structure, strengthen the institutional voice on the board of directors, and ensure the independence of the board. Therefore, institutional blockholders play an important role in increasing firm value (see, McConnell and Servaes (1990) , Martin (1996) , Kohers and Kohers (2001) Institutional blockholders can force acquirer managers to examine carefully their acquisition strategies. As a result, management's forecasts of acquisition gains would be less optimistic than when there is no institutional blockholder. Institutional blockholders can prevent high risk SGO-type acquisitions that are driven by managers' overconfidence or overoptimism. Therefore, it is expected that the monitoring of institutional blockholders may force managers to be more objective in their acquisition strategies. Firms thus will be less likely to undertake the highly risky SGO-type acquisitions. This may cure the overinvestment problem. On the other hand, institutional shareholders can fine-tune their monitoring to ensure that managers do not pass up valuable but nonetheless high risk acquisitions because of their risk aversion.
Thus under strict institutional monitoring, SGO type high technology acquisitions may be optimal and value creating strategies. We shall then observe that there is a positive relationship between institutional monitoring and shareholder value gains i n high technology acquisitions. Where this monitoring fails, we shall observe a negative relationship.
Board composition -independence, dominant CEO and board committees
Another corporate control mechanism is the independence of the board of directors. Agency theory casts the board as the guardian of stockholder welfare (Fama and Jensen (1983) ). However, some researchers see the board as little more than a 'rubber stamp' which serves only to legitimize the management decisions. This is because top management both select and dominate the board ( Pfeffer (1972) ) and outside directors, many of whom are executive directors of other firms, are busy people and unlikely to become intimately involved in the affairs of the host company (Mace (1971) ). Therefore, some researchers claim that the ability of the board to act as a guardian of stockholder welfare is a function of board composition (Mizruchi (1983) ).
If management dominates the board, then even in the event of deteriorating performance, management's position should remain secure, at least in relation to the board. If, on the other hand, the board has control over management, then top management may be ousted by the board.
Successive UK corporate governance regimes from the Cadbury Report in 1992 to the most recent Higgs Report in 2003 have emphasised the critical role of nonexecutive directors and laid down guidelines for ensuring their independence. As with the institutional shareholders, non-executive directors can monitor managers' tendency towards over-or under-investment arising from their risk attitudes and compensation incentives. A board with a high degree of directorial independence is likely to monitor SGO-type acquisitions robustly and ensure that they create shareholder value.
The empirical findings about the impact of non-executive directors on firm performance are inconsistent. Franks, Mayer and Renneboog (2001) find positive impact of percentage of non-executives on the firm performance by using UK data. Yermack (1996) and Weir, Laing and Mcknight (2002) do not find significant positive relationship from the proportion of non-executive directors and firm performance. Weir (1997) and Laing and Weir (2000) find negative relationship. Empirical evidence for the impact of board independence on the risk profile of corporate investment policies and on the risk-return trade-off in such investments is scarce. On the basis of the conceptual arguments set out above, we expect that board independence will be positively related to shareholder value gains from high technology acquisitions.
Duality is another board structure variable, which occurs when the same person undertakes the combined roles of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairman of the board (Cadbury Committee (1992) ). Agency theory argues that boards dominated by executive directors are more difficult to control (Fama and Jensen (1983) ), a situation that would clearly apply to duality. By serving also as board chairman, the CEO will acquire a wider powerbase and focus of control, thus weakening decision control by the board ( Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1987) , Cadbury Committee (1992) ). Duality therefore appears to impair the ability of the board to ensure that the firm pursues goals consistent with shareholder value enhancement. Dominant CEOs represented by duality may also be prone to the behavioural weaknesses such as hubris, overconfidence and overoptimism, unchecked by robust board monitoring.
Research on the duality-performance relationship has, however, produced mixed results. Weir, Laing and Mcknight (2002) do not find significant relationship between duality and company performance. The survey by Professors Peter Hebert and Vic Dulewica do find companies with a non-executive chairman tend to perform better than those with boards headed by an executive (Tassell (24 March 2003) ). However, the evidence is not strong. On the basis of the conceptual arguments above, however, we expect that duality will have a negative impact on shareholder value gains from high technology acquisitions.
Impact of board subcommittees such as audit committee and remuneration committee as agency control devices is also relevant. Although there is no strong empirical association between board sub-committees and managerial risk taking, board sub-committees play a critical role in safeguarding the shareholders' interest (Cadbury Committee (1992) , Greenbury (1995) and Hampel report (1998)). Therefore, we expect that the existence of these committees will have a positive impact on post-acquisition performance.
Control variables
Payment method 1 Previous literature argues that payment methods have a signalling effect (Myers and Majluf (1984) , Travlos (1987) , Sudarsanam, Holl and Salami (1996) , Loughran and Vijh (1997) , Rau and Vermaelen (1998) , Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) ). If managers are better informed about the long-term prospects of their firm than the market, they will tend to pay for the acquisitions with shares when they believe that their stocks are overvalued and use cash otherwise. Martin (1996) suggests that managers tend to pay with stocks when they are buying targets with high growth opportunities and more information asymmetry thereby minimising the valuation risk (Sudarsanam, 2003, ch. 16 ). In high tech acquisitions with larger scope for valuation errors, use of stock is likely to minimise the valuation risk to acquirers than cash offers. Post-acquisition value gains should therefore be greater with the former payment method.
Size of acquirer
Some studies argue that acquirer size is an important influence on takeover gains. Large acquirers gain less than small acquirers since the asset base of the former is bigger and increasing its stock returns following acquisitions is more difficult than by small acquirers. We, therefore, include acquirer size as a control variable.
Data and methodology
Data
Using Security Data Company (SDC), we identify all the UK domestic M&As during the period [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] 2 in the database. To be included in the sample, these transactions have to be: 1) completed with an announcement date and effective date that occur during our sample period 2) with acquirers listed companies and with neither acquirers and targets in "financial industry" or "utility industry" 3 ; 3) with no less than 50% of the stake of the target companies 4 (2001)). R&D scoreboard provides industry 3 Companies in these industries are excluded since they face different regulatory environments from those of companies in other industries. 4 Although effective control may be achieved through a holding of less than 50% of a firm's issuing shares, the constraint set will ensure that bids examined are only those where it is unambiguously clear that control of the target has passed to the acquirer (Brown, Philip, and Raymond Da Silva Rosa, 1998 Tobin's Q and firm value. Tobin' s Q is a measure of intangible assets embodying future growth opportunities The higher the Tobin's Q is, the higher is the level of intangible assets. Servaes (1991) documents that bidder returns are highest when high Q bidders buy low Q targets, and the worst the when low Q acquirers buy high Q targets. The first case is equivalent to the AHITLO group and the second is equivalent to the ALOTHI group.
The industry classification of R&D scoreboard is based on FTSE-Actuaries 
Methodology
Event-study methodology
The event window in this study is three years after acquisition effective day (day 0). BHARs are calculated over this period. Control portfolio approach and control firm approach based on different combination of industry, size and book value of equity to its market value (BEME) are used as benchmark to calculate the benchmark returns.
Abnormal returns
i BHAR is calculated as
where month t = 1 is the first month following the effective month, t i R , is the return on stock i on month t, and T is the three-year anniversary month of the effective month. If either sample firm or benchmark firm is delisted before T i , a zero return is imputed 12 .
The BHAR for the portfolio of sample firms is then calculated as:
where ABHAR T is the equally weighted BHARs for firm i over time period T. N is the total number of observations in the portfolio.
Benchmark models
Results based on the following benchmarks are reported in this paper: Industrymatched control portfolio, Size and BEME matched control portfolio, Industry, size and 11 SDC allocates high-tech code according to a company's lines of business. A company may have more than 1 high-tech code if it has more than one line of high tech business. Our industry relatedness criterion screens all lines of business of both acquirer and target. For example, if one of the sub-lines of an acquirer's and target's businesses is in biotechnology, they are in the same industry group. We consider all lines of business instead of just the primary line of business. 12 According to Baker and Limmack (2001) , there are mainly three ways of dealing this survivorship bias problem: excluding those firms who do not survive the whole examination period, replacing returns following de-listing with a "proxy return" and imputing a zero return. The first approach decreases the sample size and brings more survivorship bias. They found that using proxy returns and imputing zero returns yield qualitatively similar results. 13 Negative book value firms are not included in the samples of Fama and French 1992, Fama and French 1993 . The reason is that the interpretation of negative BEME is problematic. For the same market value, higher BE signifies a lack of growth opportunities but it is impossible to impose the same interpretation on the BEME ratio when the BE is negative. 14 DS industrial classification exist at six levels.
• Level 1, is the total market.
• level 2 comprises of 5 sectors: total non-financials; total non-financials, excluding mineral extraction; mineral extraction; financials; investment trusts • level 3 comprises of 7 sectors: mineral extraction; general manufacturers; consumer goods; services; utilities; financials; investment trusts.
• Level 4 classification, comprises up to 38 sectors, based on the FTSE-Actuaries system.
• level 5 comprising up to 76 FTSE-Actuaries sub-sectors. Various level 4 sectors are broken down at this level into more detailed descriptions used by the London stock exchange • level 6 comprising up to 83 Datastream sub-sectors. These level 6 groups have been devised by Datastream where we believe that more detailed descriptions than those provided at level 4 and 5 are more appropriate. 15 Datastream indicate that at levels 4, 5 and 6, the number of sectors and sub-sectors will vary over time.
In addition, I suspect the industry classifications of firm may change over time. Hence we download each variables for each year over 1990-2002. The result shows neither sample firm nor universe firm changes industry classification.
Size and BEME-matched control portfolio approach is similar to previous studies such as Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) , Barber and Lyon (1997) , Kothari and Warner (1997) , Rau and Vermaelen (1998) , Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) .
Specifically, we form 5 size quintiles at the end of every month on the basis of the ranked market value of equity of the universe firms. Each size quintile is then broken down into book-to-market quintiles, resulting in 25 size and BEME control portfolios.
This procedure is repeated every month between January 1990 and December 1999. 25 portfolio returns are then formed every month by averaging the monthly returns for the firms in each of the portfolio. To obtain the acquirer's abnormal return, each sample firm is matched to its appropriate portfolio. These returns are then used as benchmarks to calculate the abnormal performance. For each sample firm, the benchmark portfolio is rebalanced once a year.
The identification process of the matched firm is similar to the size and BEMEmatched control portfolio approach. The difference is that industry classification is the first filter. INDC6 is used as the industry filter. The second filter is size filter and the third is BEME filter. Following Barber and Lyon (1996) , we use 70%-130% of the sample firm's MV at the month end of 2 month prior to the effective month as the range of the size filer i.e. month -2 relative to the effective month 0. Lastly, for firms that come through the industry and size filters, only the one with BEME closest to BEME of the sample firm at the month end of -2 month is chosen as the benchmark firm. If there is no benchmark firm is found, reset the industry filter as INDC5 then follow the same process until a control firm is found. For each sample firm, the benchmark portfolio is rebalanced once a year.
Significance testing
This study applies four test methods for significance testing for the long-term abnormal returns: Student's t -test, Johnson's skewness-adjusted t-test, Fisher's sign test, and Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Table 1 shows the distribution of M&As for SGO sample. Column 2 shows the annual breakdown of the initial sample. However, the initial sample has a clustering problem which happens when the event windows of individual acquisitions overlap (Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) , chapter 4). The existence of clustering may contaminate the statistical inference since the statistical testing approaches assume mutual independence of individual securities. To reduce clustering, we filter the initial sample by imposing the constraint that the distance between two acquisition effective dates by the same acquirer is no less than 3 years. That is to say, if the same acquirer undertakes more than one acquisition within 3 years, only the last one is included in the sample. This generates the restricted sample. The sample distribution is shown in column 3. The sample size reduces from 386 in initial sample to 228 in the restricted sample. Both initial sample and restricted sample show SGO-type acquisitions mainly concentrated between 1997 and 1999.
Results
Sample characteristics
[Insert table 1 here]
Table 2 presents summary statistics for acquirers in SGO sample. Column 4 lists number of observations with data available fo r the corresponding variable shown in column 1. There is not much difference between initial sample and restricted sample except the mean of transaction value (median is similar). Given the statistical inference problem with the initial sample, the following analysis is based on the restricted sample.
In the restricted sample, the average acquisition size is approximately £21 million and the average acquirer market capitalisation is £518 million (figures rounded up). The median transaction value (TV) (£5 million) and the acquirer size (£65 million) are smaller than the mean. Sample size is greatly reduced when 11 companies with negative BEME ratio are excluded 16 . Since this number is not large, exclusion does not create a serious survivorship bias problem. The average BEME of acquirers is 34%
(median 18%). The acquirers in SGO sample are considered as having high growth opportunities. The managerial ownership (MANSHR) of acquirers on average is 15%
(median 7%). The institutional ownership (INSTSHR) of acquirers is higher than managerial ownership, with the mean 24% (median 20%). The percentage of nonexecutives on the board (NEXE) of acquirers is around 42%.
[Insert table 2 here]
50% of sample acquisitions are by acquirers from non-high-tech industries (38% for initial sample). 77% of the acquirers do not have dual CEO-cum-Chairman (DUAL) (77% for initial sample). 88% of acquirers have an audit committee (AUD) (85% for initial sample). The same proportion of acquirers has audit committees too.
Long term shareholder value performance
The three-year holding-period returns for acquirers in restricted SGO sample are presented in Table 3 . Three benchmarking approaches are used: industry-matched control portfolio, size and BEME-matched control portfolio and industry, size and BEME-matched firm. Sample sizes are different when applying different approaches due to incomplete data for required variables.
[Insert table 3 here]
Specifically, compared with industry-matched control portfolio, the average three-year post-acquisition returns are -109% (significant at 1%) and the median is -41% (significant at 1%). The magnitude of the underperformance is much larger than the value reported by Kohers and Kohers (2001) , who report mean value -17.5% and median value -17.4%. Compared with size and book-to-market matched control portfolio, the average three-year post-acquisition performance is -35% (significant at 1%) and the median is -63% (significant at 1%). Kohers and Kohers (2001) report mean value of CAR -18.7%. The long-run underperformance of acquirers undertaking SGOtype acquisitions seems to indicate that the expected growth options do not materialise.
Taken together, acquirers in SGO-type acquisitions significantly underperform not only their industry rivals, but also firms with similar size and BEME characteristics.
We also examine the annual abnormal returns to determine if the bidders' underperformance is dominant in any particular post-acquisition year. The acquirer performance relative to industry-matched control portfolio is generally improving from the first to the third year. It is the opposite when using size and BEME-matched control portfolio as benchmark. When industry, size and BEME-matched control firm is the benchmark, acquirers experience no value destruction in the first two years in terms of mean returns and only marginal value erosion in terms of median returns. In the third post-acquisition year, however, value losses are larger and more significant. The value loss is a mean of 16% and median of 9%. The cumulated mean returns of 6% over the first 24 months are insignificant and the median of 13% is only marginally significant.
Over 36 post-acquisition months, however, both mean and median returns compared to the control firms are highly significant and of the order of 27% to 38%. The above results provide evidence that SGO-type acquisitions generally destroy shareholder value in the long term. 
Determinants of long term shareholder value gains -univariate results
R&D intensity and long -term performance
Industry relatedness and long -term performance
The evidence for the impact of industry relatedness on shareholder returns is not strong (Panel B, Table 4 has little impact on shareholder value losses from these acquisitions.
Past performance and long-term performance
Prior evidence shows that highly rated glamour acquirers generate smaller value or greater losses than lower rated value acquirers (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003) . Glamour is proxied by low pre-acquisition BEME and value by high BEME. Table 4 , Panel C shows that both glamour bidders (GLABID) and value bidders (VALBID) have significant negative performance. Glamour bidders with low BEME in the pre-bid period conducting high tech acquisitions destroy more firm value than value bidders, with median returns of -77% compared to -45% for the value acquirers. But the difference is not significant. As argued in Section 2, glamour bidders may be more prone than value bidders to behavioural biases like hubris, overconfidence and over optimism. Our results, while pointing to this possibility, nevertheless offer no strong evidence.
Acquirer size and long -run performance
Acquirer size measured by market value of equity r eveals no significant differences between large acquirers (LARACQ) and small acquirers (SMAACQ).
Specifically, the mean BHARs for large acquirers is -36%, versus -34% by small acquirers. There is no significant group difference.
Managerial stock ownership and long-run performance
In Panel E of Table 4 , we find that acquirers with low managerial stock ownership outperform (median -57% return) those with high ownership (-71%) albeit the difference is not significant. Managers with both high and low equity ownership in their firms undertake value destroying high tech acquisitions. However, this risk taking behaviour is stronger when managers have high equity stake. This evidence, though not conclusive, is consistent with our expectation set out in Section 2 that high managerial stock ownership will have a negative impact on shareholder wealth gains.
Monitoring and long -run performance
In Panels F to I of Table 4 we report the shareholder value gains for different monitoring mechanisms. Institutional blockholders (INSTSHR) do not seem to have a positive monitoring effect on managerial risk seeking behaviour and consequently on the shareholder value gains of high technology acquisitions. Acquirers with at least 50% of non-executive directors generate median return of -61% compared to -69% by those with less than 50%. Firms without dominant CEOs i.e. no duality (NDUAL) and those with an audit committee (AUD) do not perform significantly better than firms with dominant, dual-role CEOs (DUAL) and without an audit committee (NAUD). The mean BHARs for NDUAL acquirers is -33%, versus -41% for firms with duality, and -28% for firms with an audit committee (AUD) versus -33% for firms without an audit committee (NAUD). However, the difference between groups is insignificant. These results are consistent with findings by Weir, Laing and Mcknight (2002) that nonduality and board subcommittees do not exert a positive effect on firm value. These results imply that these corporate governance devices do not prevent value destroying high risk investments by managers. Overall, corporate governance structure or institutional blockholder monitoring has little effect on high risk, value destroying, overinvestment by managers.
Means of payment and long -run performance
The examination of bidder BHARs by method of payment reveals no significant difference between stock offer (STOCK), cash offer (CASH) and mixed offers (MIX).
Pure stock acquisitions are a very proportion of our sample and considerably less frequent than cash offers. This is surprising since, given the high valuation risk inherent in high technology acquisitions, a stock offer is more likely to mitigate that risk than pure cash offers. The greater frequency of mixed offers than pure cash offers suggests that acquirers seek to mitigate the valuation risk at least partially through mixed offers.
As expected, there is evidence, albeit weak, that acquisitions paid for by cash perform worse than acquisitions paid by stocks. The mean BHARs for cash (CASH) group is -43%, significant at 1%, and that for stock (STOCK) group is -37, insignificant.
However, the BHARs are highly skewed and in terms of median returns it is the mixed offer acquirers who outperform the pure cash and pure equity acquirers. The very small sample size of the pure stock group makes any strong inference about the relative performance of this group difficult.
Multivariate model of long run post-acquisition value gains
Univariate analyses so far show that none of the individual explanatory variables has a significant impact on the post-acquisition performance of SGO-type acquisitions. We carry out a multiple regression analysis to examine the joint effects of these variables on acquisition related value gains. The dependent variable (AR) is the 3-year BHARs of the SGO sample.
AR = f(Risk, glamour status, managerial ownership, payment method, size)
Risk is proxied alternatively by two variables already defined for our univariate analyses above and in Table 4 : the relative R&D intensity of an acquirer and its target and the industry relatedness. Three dummy variables are allocated to acquisitions which are in AHITLO group, ALOTHI group or AHITHI group. Alternatively, two dummy variables are allocated to non-related industry (NRELIND) and related industry (RELIND) acquisitions. We include both a linear and a quadratic term in managerial ownership MANSHR and MANSHR 2 to capture any non-linearity in the relationship between managerial equity stake and value gains from acquisition. NONCASH is a dummy variable for payment method equal to 1 if payment involves stock (NONCASH) and 0 otherwise. LogMV is the natural logarithm of the ma rket value of equity of the acquirer at month -2 month prior to announcement month. Table 5 
[Insert table 5 here]
The same conclusion may be drawn when industry relatedness is used as the are all insignificant in all the models.
Taken together, multivariate regressions do not show a significant negative relation between the risk profile of high tech acquisitions and post-acquisition performance.
Instead, we find evidence that high tech firms acquiring other high tech firms, though not in the same industry, enhance shareholder value, even though such acquisitions are ostensibly risk multiplying. An alternative interpretation of this result is that high tech firms have the resources and capabilities to manage equally high tech targets and leverage them to create value. High equity ownership seems to encourage managers to undertake high tech acquisitions that destroy value for shareholders even though such ownership is intended to align management and shareholder interests. High equity ownership seems to result in over-investment in high risk acquisitions. Monitoring mechanisms have no disciplinary effect on managers' risk taking behaviour leading to shareholder value destruction. Payment method also has no impact on post-acquisition performance, contrary to earlier empirical evidence e.g. Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) who report that stock exchange acquisitions destroy more value than cash acquisitions.
The larger the acquirer, the more shareholder value is destroyed in high tech acquisitions.
Summary and Conclusions
The fifth merger wave in the USA and the parallel fourth merger wave in the UK that occurred in the 1990s was characterised by a large number of acquisitions of firms operating in high technology areas such as the telecommunications, computers, the Table 7 lists the number of firms in the listed-company composites and non-listed company composites.
There are no un-listed company composites in 1996 and 1997. We can see from the In R&D scoreboard, R&D intensity is calculated as R&D expenditures as % of sales.
The definition of R&D expenditures is consistent with the Statement of Standard
Accounting Practice (SSAP) 13. The industry or company composite R&D intensity is calculated by dividing the sum of all the companies' R&D expenditures by the sum of all the companies' sales in the industry or in the composite. years, with average 10 year ratio as high as 13.06%, followed by heALOTHI care, IT hardware, software & IT services. 19 The value limit for other years is not available from the current online database. 
